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The Utah Department of Administrative Services 
(the "Department") respectfully submits this brief in reply 
to the answering briefs of the Stipulating Parties. !/ 
I. THE ASSERTIONS OF THE STIPULATING PARTIES THAT 
THE ORIGINAL SUPREME COURT DECISION WAS LIMITED 
TO JURISDICTION AND WAS OTHERWISE DICTA CONTRA-
DICT POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE PARTIES IN THIS CASE. 
Throughout their briefs, the Stipulating Parties 
attempt to confine the scope of the original decision of 
this Court in this case to the issue of the Public Service 
Commission's ("Commission") jurisdiction over certain oil 
and gas properties. Thus, state the Division and the Com-
mittee, "This Court's holding in the Wexpro Case declared 
jurisdictional law, but directed no specific plan or result." 
Joint Brief of Utah Department of Business Regulation, 
Division of Public Utilities and Utah Committee of Consumer 
Services ("Joint Brief") at 26. Mountain Fuel states, "[I]t 
is clear that the Opinion does not mandate specific regula-
tory conduct. H Answering Brief of Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company and Wexpro Company ("Mountain Fuel Brief") at 
32, n. 13. See also Mountain Fuel Brief at 6, n. 4, and 8. 
1. This Brief shall sometimes refer collectively to Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel"), Wexpro Company 
(nwexpro"), the Utah Department of Business Regulation, 
Division of Public Utilities ("Division 11 ) and the 
Utah Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee"), as 
the "Stipulating Parties." The Utility Shareholder 
Association of Utah, Alex Oblad and Harold Burton shall 
be referred to as the "Shareholder Association." 
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The parties incorporated their limited interpretation of 
this Court's decision in the Stipulation. 
However, in Committee of Consumer Services v. Public 
Service Corrrrnission of Utah, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the Order of the Com-
mission on. jurisdictional grounds and remanded the 
issue to the Commission for further hearings. 
Stipulation ,!l.13, R. 03548 (emphasis added). 
The Stipulating Parties' attempt to characterize 
this Court's decision as solely jurisdictional, as merely 
suggestive, Mountain Fuel Brief at 9, and as "direction and 
guidance", Joint Brief at 3, flies in the face of the posi~ 
tion taken previously by each of the Stipulating Parties. 
The Stipulating Parties' denial that this Court's 
decision declared that as a matter of law the public interest 
requires that the oil profits from utility assets be used to 
reduce future rates; that the Commission must decide, before 
Wexpro or Celsius can exist, whether it is in the public 
interest for Mountain Fuel to split its oil and gas explora-
tion function with a subsidiary; that if Wexpro exists it 
is, by nature of its gas plant, a public utility; and that 
Mountain Fuel cannot pay Wexpro or Celsius market prices for 
gas and pass the entire cost to ratepayers, is a denial 
directly contrary to the positions taken by these parties 
when other positions were more convenient to their aims. 
-2-
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In Mountain Fuel's and Wexpro's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court ("Mountain 
Fuel Petition for Certiorari"), Appendix "A" to Brief of 
Utah Department of Administrative Services ("Department 
Brief"), Mountain Fuel and Wexpro stated: 
Upon direct appeal, -the Utah Supreme- Court, in a 
divided opinion, held that the non-utility oil 
properties had always been and are utility assets, 
and that these properties and the oil revenues gene-
rated from them should be "applied to reduce the 
cost of gas" to the Utah utility customer. 
Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at 13 (emphasis added). 
[T]he court majority, on the basis of a 
new theory that Mountain Fuel stood in a "trust 
relationship" when it sold natural gas to its 
utility customers . . . held that (i) sales of 
interstate gas by Wexpro to Mountain Fuel must be 
at the cost-of-service price rather than the federal 
ceiling price, even when the gas comes from acreage 
independently developed by Wexpro ... and (ii) Wexpro, 
along with any other company in interstate corrunerce 
that sells jointly developed gas to Mountain Fuel, is 
itself a public utility s·ubject to Utah regulation.-
Id. at 14 (emphasis added) . 
These concepts, taken together, leave no room for 
Mountain Fuel or Wexpro to conduct a non-utility 
business in oil or gas, subject Wexpro to Utah regulation 
as a public utility, and require Wexpro to sell gas to 
Mountain Fuel at cheap prices . . . far below the 
federal ceiling level for comparable vintage supply. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This case is mature for review by this Court because 
the federal questions have been resolved with 
finality, the regulation and taking are certain and 
all that remains is an accounting proceeding. 
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Id. at n. 7 (emphasis added). Mountain Fuel's and Wexpro's 
new position, which attempts to limit the decision's scope, 
should be accorded by this Court whatever credibility it can 
muster in light of their conveniently changed position. 
The Division's and Committee's position·that the 
decision was solely jurisdictional is entitled to absolutely 
no credibility--indeed, the Division is judicially estopped 
from taking that position. In their Brief in Opposition to 
Mountain Fuel's Petition for Certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court ("Brief Opposing Certiorari"), Appendix 
"B" to the Department's Brief, the Division and the Committee 
stated to the United States Supreme Court: 
The Utah Supreme Court held with regard to the 
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's non-
utility accounts (1) such properties were utility 
properties, and (2) such properties should be 
included in Mountain Fuel's utility accounts for 
ratemaking purposes .... The bottom line of the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision ~as that the net profits 
from Mountain Fuel's oil properties beyond all 
costs associated with their production, including 
the cost of capital, should be applied to the 
benefit of the Utah ratepayers through a reduction 
in their future rates. (Citations omitted.) 
* * * 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in light of these past 
practices, adopted a "no-profit-to-affiliates" rule 
which prohibited such intracompany profits from 
being included in consumer rates, and applied that 
rule to the Mountain Fuel-Wexpro option so as to pre-
vent any profit realized by Wexpro under that option 
from being passed on to Mountain Fuel's ratepayers. 
The Utah Supreme Court also held that Wexpro, by 
reason of its relationship as a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Mountain Fuel and the unique relationship 
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between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro created under the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Joint Explora-
tion Agreement, was, under Utah law, a public 
utility. 
* * * 
The Supreme Court not only set aside the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement and the Joint Exploration Agree-
ment, the Supreme Court of Utah left open the ques-
tion of whether Wexpro is to exist at all. 
Brief Opposing Certiorari at 14-16 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the Division and the Committee now give as 
one basis for limiting the scope of this Court's decision 
the consistent "understanding of the Division and the 
Committee, that a portion of the oil profits would be 
retained by the shareholders to compensate for that risk of 
development assumed by the shareholders .. II Joint Brief 
at 8. That is a categorical misstatement of the Division's 
and Committee's consistent position. Until the Stipulation 
and Agreement, it was always the position of the Division 
and Committee that the shareholders had never assumed any of 
the risk of development and that this Court's decision held 
that all oil profits from utility assets must be used to 
reduce rates. Not only did the Division argue to the United 
States Supreme Court the positions quoted at pages 4-5, 
supra, but the Division repeatedly argued to the Commission 
after remand that this Court had decided that the ratepayers 
are entitled to all of the oil profits because they have 
borne all of the risk of exploration and development. 
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In its Hearing Brief on Remand, the Division stated: 
To the ·extent this Commission considers any issue other 
than classification and the reduction of rates to the 
extent of all net oil and gas profits or to the extent 
this Commission considers any issue in a manner 
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, 
then this Commission is not within its statutory 
mandate, and its actions will be contrary to law. 
Id. at R. 02491-92 (emphasis added). 
To the extent that portion of the [Commission's 
Prehearing] Order means less than all of the net 
oil profits on all utility assets are to be applied 
to reduce the cost of gas, that portion of the Order 
is not in accordance with the Supreme Court opinion 
and must be stricken. 
Id. at R. 02492-93 (emphasis added). See also id. at R. 
02486, 02487-88, 02490, 02493, 02494, 02496, 02500. 
The Division further argued in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motions to Enlarge Scope of Prehearing Order: 
"[N]on-utility" net income in 1977, 1978 and 1979, 
derived from properties developed with ratepayer risk 
money, totaled an additional $31,103,000. These 
profits must be accounted for to ratepayers in this 
proceeding. 
R. 02270. 
The Division has now for the first time adopted 
the contribution theory, a theory propounded by Mountain 
Fuel after its Petition for Certiorari was denied by the 
United States Supreme Court. The Division fought that 
theory tooth and nail. In the Division's Motion to Strike 
Prefiled Testimony, R. 02206, the Division moved to strike 
any evidence relevant to the "contribution" theory. The 
Division argued that the contribution theory was foreclosed 
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because this Court had already finally determined that the 
ratepayers had assumed all of the risks. 
The Division's and Committee's change of position, 
and their refusal to acknowledge that their positions are 
changed, are especially surprising since prior to the 
settlement they took Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to task for 
that very ploy. In its Hearing Brief on Remand before the 
Commission, the Division argued: 
Mountain Fuel is not entitled under our law to 
tell the United States Supreme Court that the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision means one thing, and then 
after failing to gain review on certiorari, to change 
its story and tell this Commission that the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision means exactly the opposite. 
A party to litigation is not permitted to assume 
inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions with 
respect to the same matter in the same or a successive 
series of suits. Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New 
Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (1953). Parties are not 
allowed to play "fast and loose with the courts," 
an evil the courts should not tolerate. Intentional 
self-contradiction used as a means of obtaining 
unfair advantage is an affront to judicial dignity. 
Id. 
R. 02498. 
The same proscriptions apply to all the Stipu-
lating Parties, including the Division and the Committee. See 
Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 
1259 (Utah 1976); Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 
497 P.2d 629 (1972). ~also Standage Ventures, Inc. v. 
State of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977); Cf. 
Citizens Bank v. C&H Construction & Paving Co., Inc., 89 
N.M. 360, 552 P. 2d 796 (1976). 
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II. THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION THAT THE 
COMMISSION WAS FREE TO IGNORE THIS COURT'S 
DECISION AND FASHION ITS OWN RELIEF INDEPENDENT 
OF THIS COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENTS IHSCONCEIVES 
THIS COURT'S DECISION AND HISCONCEIVES THE 
PROPER SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S REVIEW. 
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro argue that the Commission 
is free to ignore this Court's decision and "to fashion a 
new and different solution to the problem." Mountain Fuel 
Brief at 38. The Division and the Committee argue that this 
Court ''could not bind the Commission's discretion to formu-
late an appropriate regulatory treatment to be accorded 
[utility] properties," and that "[t]he Agency is free, within 
the declared law, to take a totally new approach to the 
problem." Joint Brief at 27. The Stipulating Parties rely 
for these propositions on F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting 
Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v. 
Food Store Employees Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); and S.E.C. v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
Such reliance is misplaced. Not one of these 
cases supports the freedom of an administrative agency to 
ignore the mandate and order of a jurisdiction's supreme 
arbiter. 
Moreover, to the extent the Stipulating Parties 
premise their position on this Court's having overstepped 
the proper bounds of review by "fashioning a remedy,·" they 
have misconceived both what this Court's decision did and 
the state of administrative law. This Court held, inter 
-8-
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alia, that as a matter of law, the public interest (a) requires 
that the ratepayers have the benefits of net oil profits 
from utility assets through a reduction in rates and (b) pro-
hibits profits from wholesale sales between Mountain Fuel 
and wholly-owned subsidiaries from being charged to ratepayers 
in the retail price 0£ gas. Along with the other holdings of 
the.decision, these are legal determinations, and are unques-
tionably within this Court's power and responsibility. In 
essence, the Stipulating Parties' argument is that this 
Court does not have the power to declare, define, and deter-
mine the law of this state. That is preposterous. 
The question whether the public interest requires 
as a matter of law the utilization of the principle "gain 
follows risk" is a question of law. ~/ The majority clearly 
decided it as a question of law: 
When the expenses to develop the utility properties 
were included in the rate base, the ratepayers were 
entitled to share in the benefit by having the net 
profits on the oil, and other hydrocarbon substances, 
sold by Mountain Fuel to others, applied to reduce 
the cost of gas. 
595 P.2d at 876 (citations omitted). 
2. The Stipulating Parties rely on Empire Electric Ass'n 
v. Public Service Commission, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979), 
which held that the C01mnission had considerable latitude 
of expression in determining the public interest. The 
Department agrees with that proposition. But that 
proposition implicitly recognizes that there are lati-
tudes of discretion beyond the Commission's power. 
Those are the latitudes wherein this Court can deter-
mine as a matter of law that the public interest is or 
is not served. 
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No court has yet held that the question of the 
proper allocation, between investors and customers, of gains 
on utility assets, is not a legal question subject to appel-
late review and substitution of judgment. 
To the contrary, the appellate courts which have 
decided the question on review from administrative agencies 
have decided it as a question of law. In fact, in adopting 
the legal principle "gain follows risk," this Court implicitly 
followed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in Democratic Central Committee v. 
Washington M.A.T. Commission, 485 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). See 595 P.2d 893 
(Wilkins, J. dissenting). Democratic Central Committee, in 
a painstaking analysis of the "gain follows risk" issue, 
determined it after tracing its adjudicative history through 
appellate courts and agencies. Democratic Central Committee 
cited New York Water Service Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission, 12 App.Div. 2d 122, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1960); 
and City of Lexington v. Lexington Water Co., 458 S.W.2d 778 
(Ky. 1970), where appellate courts decided the issue. Those 
courts did not consider it outside the scope of appellate 
review. 
The Division's argument that this Court's decision 
"could not bind the Commission's discretion to formulate an 
appropriate regulatory treatment to be accorded such prop-
erties," Joint Brief at 27, is absolutely contradicted by 
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Democratic Central Committee, which is respectfully commended 
to this Court's att~ntion for careful scrutiny. 
Undeniably, appellate courts have jurisdiction to 
review legal deterrr.inations of administrative agencies. 
See, 4 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Ch. 30 (1st 
Ed. 1958) {Supp. 1976 and 1982). While it is often difficult 
to divide legal questions from factual questions, id., 
Democratic Central Committee, New York Water Service Corp. 
and Lexington Water Company make clear that this question is 
a legal one. 
Likewise, the no-profits-to-affiliates question; 
the question whether an entity with a gas plant is a public 
utility; and the question whether the Commission can allow 
Mountain Fuel to split its utility function with a subsidiary 
without an adequate hearing, are legal questions. The fact 
that the relief which the Commission must apply on remand--
e. g., a roll-in of oil profits to reduce rates--flows inexorably 
from legal determinations on these questions does not make 
them any less legal determinations. 
This Court's legal determinations were well within 
its power. Pottsville Broadcasting, Food Store Employees and 
Chenery, are inapposite here. None of those cases involved 
the failure of an administrative agency to follow the law of 
the case; or to follow the directives of a supreme tribunal 
or intermediate appellate tribunal; or to follow an appel-
late mandate; or to consider an appellate court's legal 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pronouncements as binding. None of those cases dealt with 
the abject failure by an administrative agency to follow the 
law--in short, none of those cases dealt with the question 
herein presented. Indeed, Pottsville Broadcasting itself held: 
On review the court may . . . correct errors of 
law and on remand the Commission is bound to act 
upon the correction. 
309 U.S. at 145. lf 
In fact, the cases which are on point have disting-
uished Pottsville Broadcasting and Food Store Employees on 
grounds directly applicable to the instant case. 
In Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co. v. 
United States, 574 F.2d 926, 929-30 (7th Cir. 1978), the 
Seventh Circuit held the doctrine of "law of the case" 
3. There is no broad principle of administrative law as 
stated in Pottsville Broadcasting. In fact, 
The sweep of Pottsville was cut back when Congress, 
on July 16, 1952, amended 47 U.S.C. §402 by adding 
subsection (h), providing that in the event of a 
court decision reversing an order and remanding 
the case to the FCC "to carry out the judgment of 
the court" the FCC has the duty "unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, to do so upon the basis of 
the proceedings already had and the record which 
said appeal was heard and determined." The 
Committee report stated that the addition was 
"intended to confer upon the appellate court a 
measure of control commensurate with the dignity 
and responsibility of that tribunal. 
Greater Boston Television Corporation v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 463 F.2d 268, 281-82 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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applicable to administrative proceedings, and held an 
administrative agency bound on remand to apply the legal 
principles laid down by the appellate court. It expressly 
distinguished Pottsville Broadcasting, and held that while 
ordinarily a court may not direct an administrative agency 
to reach a particular result, that limitation does not 
preclude the application of the doctrine of 11 law of the 
case" on review of administrative orders. Id. In Chicago 
& Northwestern, the Seventh Circuit further expressly held 
that Pottsville Broadcasting itself requires an administrative 
agency on remand to apply the legal principles laid down 
by the court. 
The D.C. Circuit in City of Cleveland v. 
Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
also expressly held Pottsville Broadcasting inapplicable to 
an agency determination which violates the letter or spirit 
of the mandate of an appellate court. Citing Pottsville 
Broadcasting, the Court held: 
We are mindful that 1'an administrative determination 
in which is imbedded a legal question open to judicial 
review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative 
agency, after its error has been corrected, from 
enforcing the legislative policy committed to its 
charge." .•. To this stage of the litigation, 
however, only purely legal questions have emerged 
and no aspect of congressional policy is involved, 
certainly as yet. 
561 F.2d at 346-47, n. 24 (citations omitted). City of 
Cleveland thus held: 
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The decision of a federal appellate court estab-
lishes the law binding further action in the litiga-
tion by another body subject to its authority. The 
latter "is without power to do anything which is 
contrary to either the letter or spirit of the mandate 
construed in the light of the opinion of [the] court 
deciding the case," and the higher tribunal is amply 
armed to rectify any deviation through the process 
of mandamus. "That approach," we have said, "may 
appropriately be utilized to correct a misconception 
of the scope and effect of the appellate decision." 
These principles, so familiar in operation within the 
hierarchy of judicial benches, indulge no exception 
for reviews of administrative agencies. 
Id. at 346. See Service Employees International Union 
v. National Labor Relations Board, 640 F.2d 1042, 1045-46 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
This Court has itself broadly stated its powers to 
make legal determinations, and the duty of the Public 
Service Commission to follow them: 
Notwithstanding the acknowledged powers of the 
Commission, and the deference accorded its powers, 
the statutes governing its procedure provide for a 
review by this court. This clearly indicates that no 
"rule of infallibility" should apply. Such a standard, 
or any pretention thereto, would be difficult to live 
up to. It is to be assumed that the duty imposed on 
this court was intended to be a substantial and 
responsible review of the proceedings of the Commission 
and not a mere pro forrna rubber-stamping of its 
actions. That is the basis for the rule referred to 
above that the Commission's action will not be sus-
tained if it is so without foundation in fact or 
reason that it must be deemed capricious and arbi-
trary. 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 29 Utah 2d 9, 13, 
504 P.2d 34, 37 {1972) (citations omitted). See also Silver 
Beehive Telephone Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 
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30 Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973); Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 (1959). 
Finally, if this Court had "fashioned a remedy," 
it would have acted within its power to review an admini-
strative agency. Appellate courts do indeed have the power 
to fashion administrative remedies in certain circumstances. 
See Democratic Central Committee, supra, at 823-29; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 
F.2d 391, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974). While this Court 1 s 
decision did not fashion a remedy, but only declared clear 
legal principles with certain inexorable results, as a 
matter of sheer power the law would not foreclose the court 
from fashioning remedies. Id. 
III. SECTION 54-7-10 (1), ALLOWING THE COMMISSION TO 
APPROVE SETTLEMENTS, ADDS NOTHING TO THIS INQUIRY 
BECAUSE EVEN THE STIPULATING PARTIES ADMIT THAT 
'11HE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CAN ONLY APPROVE 
LAWFUL SETTLEMENTS. 
The respondents argue that settlements are favored 
in the law, and expressly sanctioned by Utah Code Ann. 
§54-7-10(1). Of course settlements are favored generally, 
and the Commission probably did not need §54-7-10(1) to 
give it authority to approve lawful settlements. But that 
authority does not and cannot give the Commission the 
power to approve a settlement contrary to the law of the 
case and the mandate of this Court. Gorgoza v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976). 
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No case cited by any party supports the proposition 
that a reviewing court must sanction a settlement contrary 
to law or to a mandate. It is an absurd proposition. In 
fact, none of the cases cited by the Stipulating Parties or 
the Shareholder Association to show that settlements are 
favored has anything to do with settlement of a case after 
appellate reversal and remand. 
All of the parties admit that §54-7-10(1) does not 
go so far as to allow a settlement contrary to law. Joint 
Brief at 25, n. 14; Mountain Fuel Brief at 33; Shareholder 
Association Brief at 7-8. Thus, Section 54-7-10(1) adds 
nothing to the inquiry here--whether the Commission approved 
the settlement of this matter contrary to the dictates of 
this Court and the law. 
IV. CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION 
THAT ALL MATTERS WERE DEALT WITH CONSISTENTLY 
WITH THIS COURT'S POSITION, THE CO.MMISSION DID 
NOT EVEN PURPORT TO DECIDE WHETHER 110UNTAIN FUEL 
COULD DIVIDE ITS UTILITY OIL AND GAS EXPLOR~TION 
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH A SUBSIDIARY. 
Mountain Fuel states: 
[T]hat Stipulation and Agreement, and the order of the 
PSC approving same, clearly meet both the strict legal 
requirements of the Wexpro decision, as well as the 
more general observations of the Court herein. 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 41. The Division and the Conunittee 
state: 
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[T]he settlement was in the public interest and its 
terms complied with the law as declared by this Court 
in its Wexpro decision. 
Joint Brief at 5. 
However, in this Court's decision in the critical 
footnote 8, this Court expressly held that the Commission 
must decide 
the serious issue of whether it is in the public inter-
est for Mountain Fuel to divide its utility function 
between itself and a subsidiary. Relevant factors to 
be considered in this inquiry include any potential 
administrative inconvenience caused by the necessity 
of regulating the two corporate entities performing, 
in essence, a singular utility function; and addi-
tional costs and expenses affecting th~ rate base. 
595 P.2d at 878, n. 8. In wholesale contravention of that 
legal pronouncement, the Stipulation and Agreement were 
presented to the Commission on the assumption that unregu-
lated subsidiaries of the utility, and not the utility 
itself, would explore for and develop hydrocarbons. The 
acceptance by the Commission of that assumption, without an 
inquiry into whether the assumption is in the public interest, 
violated the Supreme Court's express mandate that there must 
be consideration by the Conunission of this "serious issue" 
if Mountain Fuel is to try to divide its utility function 
with a subsidiary. That issue was never set down for a 
hearing. No consideration was given that issue by the 
Cormnission. No finding on it was made. Instead, the Corn-
mission merely assumed, in a capricious manner, what it was 
ordered to determine. 
-- , ..,_ 
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Moreover, no consideration was given to the corol-
lary question whether, because Mountain Fuel refuses to 
conduct exploration and development as a utility function, 
Mountain Fuel should not be required to divest itself of its 
hydrocarbon exploration and development assets for market 
value to third parties. 
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro admit this to the Court: 
During the pendency of the Case before the 
Commission on remand, numerous problems and practical 
considerations required MFS to make certain business 
decisions and to advise the Commission that the sweep 
of the majority Opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Wexpro had made it virtually impossible for the 
Company to conduct a utility exploration and develop-
ment program or to raise new investment capital for 
that purpose. . . . 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 11 (emphasis added). This is the 
same fait accompli propounded throughout the Joint Brief and 
Mountain Fuel's Brief, i.e., that there was no possibility 
of Mountain Fuel conducting a utility exploration and develop-
ment program. 
In short, the acceptance of the Stipulation and 
Agreement by the Commission involved a·monumental begging of 
the question whether Wexpro and Celsius should even exist--a 
question which the Court directed be examined rather than 
begged. 
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V. THE CANCELLATION OF THE JOINT EXPLORATION AGREE-
MENT AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION DID NOT MOOT 
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES 
TO WEXPRO WAS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
At pages 9-10 of their answering brief, Mountain 
Fuel and Wexpro again tacitly admit the Stipulation and 
Agreement were not intended to comply with this Court's 
decision, when they contend that: 
Soon after the issuance of the majority opinion, 
Wexpro availed itself of the option and terminated the 
Joint Exploration Agreement • . . thus making moot the 
question of whether the 1976 transfer and proposed 
exploration program were detrimental to the MFS cus-
tomer, in the public interest, or for market value. 
Not only does this contention demonstrate Mountain Fuel's 
position that this Court's decision was moot and not necessary 
to abide by, the contension is false and based on a false 
premise. The Joint Exploration Agreement applied to Mountain 
Fuel's 2.9 million wildcat acres which had not been trans-
£erred to Wexpro under the Purchase and Sale Agreement. The 
cancellation of the Joint Exploration Agreement obviously 
could not moot the question whether Wexpro should exist as 
an oil and gas exploration company or whether the transfer 
of properties to Wexpro was in the public interest, because 
even after the Joint Exploration Agreement was cancelled, 
Wexpro continued to hold the purchase and sale acreage. To 
understand how vital, rather than moot, the question really 
is, this Court must understand that even though the Court 
invalidated the original Purchase and Sale Agreement, the 
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properties unlawfully transferred to Wexpro have never been 
transferred back to Mountain Fuel. The Agreement states: 
Certain of the properties described in this Agree-
ment were the subject of the conveyance from 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company to Wexpro under the 
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and have been held, 
operated and owned by Wexpro since the effective 
date of that Agreement. Except as provided in this 
Agreement to the contrary, such properties will be 
and remain the sole and exclusive property of 
Wexpro. 
Agreement 'VII-2, R. 03613-14. 
VI. THE INABILITY OF MOUNTAIN FUEL TO OPERATE A 
JOINT DRILLING PROGRAM WITH RATEPAYERS IS DUE 
NOT TO ECONOMIC IMPOSSIBILITY OR IMPRACTICALITY 
BUT TO ITS OWN REFUSAL TO DO SO. 
Mountain Fuel miscites the testimony of John F. 
O'Leary. Mountain Fuel states that Mr. O'Leary's testimony 
is that a joint program between the utility and a non-
regulated entity will not work. Mountain Fuel Brief at 20. 
Mr. O'Leary's actual testimony, however, was that a joint 
program will not work due to the "unwillingness'~ of Mountain 
Fuel and the shareholders. 
A ••.• I'm pretty sure that if we were [to] find our-
selves in a contentious situation in which the 
Commission attempted to force on an unwilling 
management a prescription for exploration that 
that set of skills would go elsewhere. And I 
think in consequence it would not be a satis-
factory experiment from the standpoint of the 
Conunission's overall objectives. 
Q. Have there, however, been instances in your 
experience that you know of where such a--let's 
call it a joint endeavor has taken place and has 
been successful? 
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A. Yes. I don't think that there's any inherent 
disability on the part of almost any form of 
organization to conduct a successful exploratory 
activity. We find, for example, next week I'll 
be dealing with- a French company that is owned 
by the French government in part. And it conducts 
its affairs in a thoroughly businesslike manner. 
And despite the fact that it's roughly 50% 
owned by its government it goes--proceeds with 
its business and is a very efficient and effective 
company in the field of exploration and develop-
ment. Similarly I deal with companies in Vene-
zuela and Mexico that are nationalized, that are 
products of the government. And they work, so 
far as I can see, well. The essence of the 
matter there is one of willingness. 
Q. There's nothing un-American or nefarious 
about such a joint endeavor then as I understand 
you? 
A. No. . . • And we found that from the very begin-
ning of electric power production in this country 
municipals have stood side by side with privately-
owned, investor-owned corporations and done, so far 
as I can see, just as well. I don't think that 
there's any magic to private sector ownership or 
public sector ownership. I think the magic is 
willingness. 
R. 01311-12 (emphasis added). 
The reason there will- be no utility exploration 
and development program was given by counsel for the Division 
when he explained the Stipulation and Agreement: 
COM. CAMERON: Does that mean that the utility 
will not in the future participate in exploration? 
MR. ANDERSON: It does. One of the foundation 
facts made very clear to us at the outset of our 
engagement and since then and in no uncertain terms 
is that there will be no return to the status quo. 
Mountain Fuel Supply as a utility is out of the 
oil and gas exploration business, not as a result 
of this settlement but as a result of their own deci-
sions made previously and subsequent to the Utah 
Supreme Court case May 10, 1979. The subsidiary, 
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Wexpro, or its successors or assigns will be entitled 
to conduct an oil and gas development program for 
shareholders free of any utility regulation. 
R. 00957 (emphasis added). 
There is really no fair reason for the shareholders' 
unwillingness. Nothing in this Court's decision prevents 
the shareholders from putting up their own money in the 
future, investing in their own oil and gas exploration and 
development with investor funds, and receiving all the 
profits therefrom. If the shareholders desire to so risk 
their own money in the future, they will not be limited to a 
utility rate of return. 
What they cannot do is take unregulated profits 
from ratepayer-financed activity. 
VII. CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION 
THAT WEXPRO'S STATUS IS UNRESOLVED, THE STIPU-
LATION AND AGREEMENT REQUIRE, IN CONTRAVENTION 
OF THE LAW OF THE CASE AND OF THIS STATE, THAT 
WEXPRO BE UNREGULATED. 
The Division and the Conunittee state that the 
Stipulation and Agreement do not resolve the issue of whether 
Wexpro is a utility. Division Brief at 16, n. 10. This 
statement is patently false. The Stipulation provides: 
Wexpro should be recognized by states in which it 
operates and all parties as an independent hydrocarbon 
exploration and development company which is not sub-
ject to state public utility regulation and which 
legally owns or operates the Properties in accord-
ance with the Agreement. 
Stipulation ~2.4, R.03553. 
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None of the parties will claim that the Properties 
owned by Wexpro are subject to the public utility regu-
lation of any state, and all parties will cooperate to 
obtain legal rulings and, if necessary, statutes so 
providing. It is acknowledged that the Company's 
rights with respect to the Properties or benefits from 
them may be subject to appropriate regulation for 
ratemaking purposes. However, that fact will in no 
way be claimed by any party as a basis for state 
public utility regulation of Wexpro in any of its 
activities with respect to the Properties. If 
Wexpro 1 s activities with respect to the Properties 
are claimed by the parties to be or are successfully 
subjected to state public utility regulation, Wexpro 
will be released from its obligations under the 
Agreement with respect to the Properties which subject 
it to regulation. 
Stipulation tll.2, R.03566. 
that: 
This directly contravenes this Court's decision 
A review of the provisions of the two agreements as 
modified by the Commission clearly indicates that, by 
the activities performed by Wexpro, it becomes a public 
utility subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of 
the Commission. . . . . 
595 P.2d at 878. 
The Stipulating Parties, with the approval of the 
Commission, have simply flaunted that holding. 
VIII. CONTRARY TO THE POSITION OF THE STIPULATING 
· PARTIES, MOUNTAIN FUEL'S REJECTED SYSTEM OF 
CLASSIFICATION IS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. 
The Division and the Cormnittee argue that the 
Department "attempts to find an issue" in the Stipulation 
and Agreement 1 s use of Mountain Fuel's rejected classifi-
cation system. Joint Brief at 12. Mountain Fuel argues 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the question of classification is "mooted" since it was 
ostensibly assumed for settlement purposes that the Commis-
sion had jurisdiction over all properties included in the 
transaction. Mountain Fuel Brief at 41. 
No analysis is given in support of those arguments. 
In fact, the classification has critical consequences to 
the Stipulation and Agreement. Such consequences are contrary 
to this Court's decision, which rejected the classification 
system as a basis for allocating benefits of oil and gas 
exploration and development between ratepayers and share-
holders. 
The settlement perpetuates that system by basing 
the "consideration" given for different classes of properties 
solely on their status as oil or gas properties under Mountain 
Fuel's rejected system. Thus, Mountain Fuel will pay its 
subsidiary market prices on gas from exploratory properties 
and after-acquired properties, but cost-of-service prices 
on gas from "productive oil" reservoirs. Thus Mountain Fuel 
obtains a 7% overriding royalty interest on hydrocarbons 
extracted from exploratory properties,but 2.5% on hydrocarbons 
extracted from the so-called "after-acquired properties." 
Thus Mountain Fuel obtains 54% of the net profits from 
"productive oil" reservoirs, but it receives overriding 
royalty interests on exploratory formations and after-acquired 
properties. Joint Brief at 12-18, expressly adopted in 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 13. 
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If there were really no difference under the Stipu-
lation and Agreement whether properties were "gas" or "oil", 
or if it were really assumed that all properties are utility 
assets, there would be no reasonable basis for those differ-
ences in "consideration." Either the classification system 
is used unlawfully, or the "market consideration" paid for 
the properties is inherently irrational. 
Moreover, the Stipulating Parties' repeated 
statement that all properties were implicitly "assumed" to 
be utility properties is false. When arguing the Agreement's 
largesse to ratepayers, the Stipulating Parties state that 
some properties involved in the Stipulation and Agreement, 
including the "after-acquired properties," were not utility 
assets. Joint Brief at 17. 
There is certainly no lawful basis for the assump-
tion that they are "non-utility." In fact, it was the 
Division's contention on remand that under this Court's 
decision the "after-acquired properties" were utility assets. 
The Division stated: 
The properties "acquired" by Wexpro from sources 
other than Mountain Fuel ("after-acquired" properties) 
• . • are themselves utility assets and the ratepayer 
reduction or refund must include the net profits from 
these assets as well. 
Division Hearing Brief on Remand, R. 02487 (emphasis added). 
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IX. MOUNTAIN FUEL'S PURCHASE OF GAS FROM CELSIUS 
AT MARKET PRICE VIOLATES THE NO-PROFITS-TO-
AFFILIATES RULE. 
The Division mischaracterizes this Court's decision 
in this case when it states: 
The only aspect of the prior arrangement which 
this Court found violative of the rule was that 
Wexpro was permitted to charge market prices for gas 
from properties for which it paid book value. 
Joint Brief at 38 (emphasis added). The Division and the 
Committee then go on to argue that since the transfers were 
for fair market value, the rule does not apply. 
This Court did not intimate that the book value 
transfer was a necessary predicate to its holding. Moreover, 
not only does the purported limitation of the no-profits-to-
affiliates rule misconceive the holding of this Court, it is 
contradicted by the very case law cited by this Court in its 
decision. This Court cited for the no-profits-to-affiliates 
rule Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 424 
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970), 
which stated: 
A regulated utility may not impose unnecessary 
costs upon its consumers. See Acker v. United States, 
298 U.S. 426, 430-31, 56 s.ct. 824, 80 L.Ed. 1257, 
and El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commis-
sion, 5 Cir., 281 F.2d 567, 573, cert. denied California 
v. Federal Power Commission, 366 U.S. 912, 81 S.Ct. 
1083, 6 L.Ed:2d 236. If the properties in question 
had been retained by Gas Company or an affiliate, 
cost of service would have determined the rate. We 
believe.t~at the alienation of the properties to a 
non-affiliate, even though made in good faith and 
for value, does not change the situation. 
Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
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X. THE STIPULATING PARTIES TAKE BASELESS, CONVENIENT 
AND CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS ABOUT THE VALUE OF 
THE INTEGRATED PACKAGE OF BENEFITS AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS CONTAINED THEREIN. 
A. The Stipulating Parties' reliance on the 
7% overriding royalty interest as both fair market considera-
tion for utility assets and a beneficial reduction from the 
market price of gas is disingenuous. 
The Stipulating Parties repeatedly argue that the 
7% overriding royalty interest represents fair market con-
sideration for the transfer of the "wildcat acreage." 
Mountain Fuel states: 
Indeed, virtually every experienced witness who took 
the stand, testified unequivocally that . . . the 
7% overriding royalty with a call on the gas consti-
tuted market value for the transfer of the exploration 
acreage. 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 27. This portion of Mountain Fuel's 
Brief is expressly adopted by the Divison and the Committee. 
Joint Brief at 6. See also Mountain Fuel Brief at 17, 26, 
29, 43; Joint Brief at 42-44. 
However, in trying to rationalize market price 
for gas, the 7% is magically converted from a fair market 
value payment for assets to a reduction from market price 
for gas: 
The utility will also receive a 7% overriding 
royalty interest on all oil and gas produced from the 
wildcat acreage (Stipulation §3.3.4), which will 
assuredly result in net gas costs at substantially 
below market prices. 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 42. See also Joint Brief at 17, 18, 
22. 
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The parties therefore use the same 7% royalty twice 
in "explaining" the benefits to ratepayers. This "double-
dipping" is disingenuous at best. 
B. The valuable call on gas and unspecified 
other benefits may well disappear in the future. 
While the Stipulating Parties argue that the 
call on gas from transferred properties is an important 
benefit, Joint Brief at 22, 46; Mountain Fuel Brief at 42, 
the Stipulation and Agreement in fact provide that if the 
no-profits-to-affiliates rule applies, .Mountain Fuel loses 
its call. Agreement 'IV-6(c), R. 03610-11. In addition, if 
any party to the settlement challenges the status of Wexpro 
as an independent non-regulated entity, Wexpro is released 
from its obligations with respect to the properties that 
subject it to regulation. Stipulation '11.2, R. 03566. 
Thus, considering the settlement terms as an integrated 
whole, there is a potential for an unknown quantum of reduc-
tion in benefits to ratepayers in return for the t~ansfer of 
oil and gas properties, and no clear provision for what 
happens if Wexpro is released from the Agreement. 
C. There is no basis in the record for the 
contention that the provision of cost-of-service gas will 
benefit the ratepayers two billion dollars over the next 
20 years. 
The Division and the Committee cite Exhibit S-2 
in support of their contention that "[b]y protecting this 
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gas from the FERC's NGPA pricing, the ratepayers are 
benefited nearly Two Billion Dollars ($2,000,000,000) over 
the next twenty (20) years." Joint Brief at 20 (footnote 
omitted). Exhibit S-2 is a letter from Washington D.C. 
counsel regarding the risks of continued litigation. Nowhere 
in Exhibit S-2 is there any reference to, let alone credible 
support for, any dollar value of cost-of-service gas, certainly 
not $2,000,000,000. In fact, during the remand hearings, 
counsel for the Division, in explaining the benefits to the 
Commission, stated: 
With that underscored caveat, that we are specu-
lating, even though on as informed a basis as possible, 
we can tell you and those interested here that the 
impact package we are talking about will be somewhere 
between four and five hundred million dollars, broken 
down as follows: the share of revenues from Wexpro, 
approximately $200 million, maybe plus; the share 
from wildcat properties which are subsequently 
explored and we hope--all parties hope, brought into 
production, perhaps another $150 million, and that is 
a conservative figure we feel ...• 
R. 00954-55. Four to five hundred million dollars may well 
be puffing. It is hardly permissible puffing or argument 
to inflate that figure, without any evidentiary support, to 
two billion dollars. 
D. Contrary to the arguments of the Stipulating 
Parties, the ratepayers under the Stipulation and Agreement 
will subsidize the risk of Wexpro's oil and gas exploration 
program. 
The Division and the Committee argue that: 
-29-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No expense will be allowed in any rate p~id by MFS 
customers which is traceable to exploration or 
development expense. 
Joint Brief at 37. Mountain Fuel argues to the same effect. 
Mountain Fuel Brief at 16. This contention is false. The 
answering briefs themselves not only admit, but emphasize, 
that Wexpro will receive "risk premiums" to compensate for 
the risk of drilling. 
If they find new gas, an incremental incentive allow-
ance (8% on successful, commercial gas wells and 5% 
on successful oil wells) is provided for (Agreement 
§§II-8, III-5) to help compensate for these costs 
[of drilling dry holes] and the dry-hole risks. 
Mountain Fuel Brief a~ 57 (emphasis added). See also Joint 
Brief at 16, n. 9, where the Division and the Committee 
explain: 
To the extent that development drilling is success-
ful, a five percent (5%) premium will be allowed in 
addition to the base rate of return ·on investment in 
successful wells to compensate for the risk of develop-
mental drilling .... (Emphasis added.) 
The ratepayers are in fact defraying the costs of 
unsuccessful exploration--in other words, paying compensation 
for the risks -of dr}" holes. -~/ 
4. The Stipulating Parties argue that the ratepayers 
will pay nothing traceable toward the risk of explora-
tion and development when that is a convenient argu-
ment to show great ratepayer benefit. However, when 
it becomes necessary to rationalize the "risk premiums," 
those parties admit they are to defray risk. Neither 
the Division nor Mountain Fuel even attempts to recon-
cile this contradiction. 
-30-
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XI. THE STIPULATING PARTIES MISCHARACTERIZED AND 
MISQUOTED ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT 
IN ITS BRIEF. 
The Division and the Committee in their Joint Brief 
list what are supposed to be six inaccuracies contained in 
the Department's original brief in this appeal. Each pur-
ported inaccuracy is quoted and underlined in the Joint 
Brief. None of the six is an accurate quotation. Not only 
are the Department•s points misquoted, but they are either 
taken out of context, mischaracterized, or inaccurately 
argued to be erroneous. In fact, each of the Department's 
statements is absolutely correct. 
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro also mischaracterize the 
Department's arguments and falsely try to refute them. For 
the sake of brevity, the Department herein sets forth only 
the most blatant falsehoods and false quotations. 
A. Mountain Fuel in its Brief at page 58 
cites as false the Department's statement that the producing 
oil reservoirs, originally transferred to Wexpro under the 
original Purchase and Sale Agreement, "will be and remain 
the sole and exclusive property" of Wexpro. The Department 
took this supposedly "false" contention right out of the 
Agreement, which states: 
Schedule 2(a) sets forth a complete list of produc-
tive oil reservoirs. 
Any right, title and interest to the properties 
described on Schedules 2(a) and 2(b) and the cor-
responding leases, oper-atfng rights, wells and 
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appurtenant facilities held by Wexpro will be and 
remain the sole and exclusive property of Wexpro 
Agreement ,1,[II-1 and II-2, R. 03595 (emphasis added). 
B. The Division quotes the Department as saying: 
The Division gave up its right to represent 
the public interest before the Commission. 
Joint Brief at 8. The Joint Brief misquotes the Depart-
ment's Brief. The Department stated that: 
The Division, without legislative authority, gave 
up its power to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel, 
Wexpro or Celsius in violation of its duties to 
represent the public interest before the Commission. 
Department Brief at 10. The Department is not arguing and 
never has argued that the Division gave up all its authority 
to represent the public interest before the Commission. 
However, the Division uncontrovertedly gives up, under the 
Stipulation and Agreement, its power to challenge the actions 
of Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or Celsius. Stipulation ,f ,I 5. 2, 11. 2, 
12, 15.4, R. 03556, 03566-67, 03570. 
C. The Division quotes the Department as stating: 
MFS's exploration program ended when the 
settlement was approved. 
Joint Brief at 9. The Department actually stated: 
In contravention of the law, the Stipulation and 
Agreement lead immediately to the end of Mountain 
Fuel's utility exploration and development program. 
Department Brief at 12. The quote is inaccurate, and the 
Department's statement is correct. What's more, Mountain 
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Fuel's unilateral cessation of its exploration program in 
1980 makes the situation worse, not better, for the Stipula-
ting Parties. Ceasing the program without approval of the 
Public Service Commission was contrary to the law of the 
State of Utah. In any event, the record could not be more 
clear that under the Stipulation and Agreement the utility 
will not be exploring and developing hydrocarbons. 
XII. THE PETITION BY THE SHAREHOLDER ASSOCIATION IS 
A SHAM AND ARGUMENTS CONCERNING RES JUDICATA 
ARE NOT APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THLS COURT ON THIS 
APPEAL. 
The positions of the Shareholder Association and 
Mountain Fuel regarding the res judicata effect of the 
Commission Order do not involve a real controversy and 
cannot be considered by this Court on this appeal. In fact, 
if there is a controversy, the Shareholder Association 
which is in part funded by Mountain Fuel, and Mountain Fuel 
which is as a matter of course aided by the Shareholder 
Association in legal disputes, are on the same side. That 
is obvious from a reading of the Shareholder Association's 
answering brief which makes the very same arguments as 
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro. 
The Shareholder Association is asking this Court 
for an advisory opinion. There is simply no issue in this 
case which makes it appropriate for the Court to rule upon 
the res judicata effect of the Report and Order. The Share-
holder Association cannot show that it has sustained or that 
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it is immediately in danger of sustaining any direct injury 
as a result of the supposed lack of finality herein. See 
Baird v. State of Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978); see 
also Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980); Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). 
All parties arguing in favor of res judicata, 
including the Stipulating Parties and the Shareholder 
Association, seek the same thing--a fiat by this Court that 
the Order is final and binding. The Shareholder Association 
argues that notwithstanding language to the contrary in the 
Report and Order, the Report and Order is not final enough 
to suit it. Mountain Fuel counters with an argument that 
the Order is final. Clearly they seek the same thing--
something this Court cannot provide--a declaration that the 
order is res judicata and precludes a future Commission from 
redetermining the issues involved in this appeal. Such a 
determination must await an actual case or controversy, if 
ever that should arise, that puts that issue squarely before 
the Court. 
f'-
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 
1982. 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
By e L:. 
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The Honorable Public Service Commission 
ATTEN7ION: Chairman Milly 0. Bernard 
·330 East 400 South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ArTORN E:YS AT LAW 
SUITE ~00 DESERET BUILDING 
79 SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 -
1801) S:3Z·l500 
92 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
PROVC, UTAH 84601 
t8011 ZZS ·'7210 
PAUL. H. RAY 11893-19671 
C. PRESTO" Al.I.EN 119Zl·l97ll 
MAR"''" .J. s::1:1-:-oc ... 11915-19781 
k '"'· NEcf.:",EJ:i 1189S-1geoJ 
Re: In the Matter of the Petition of the.Division 
of Public Utilities to Consider the Prooosed 
Transfer of Certain Wells, Etc. of Moun~ain Fuel 
Supply Company to Wexpro Company on Remand from 
the Utah Supreme Court,- Case No. 76-057-14 
Honorable Corr.missioners: 
The following is furnished in response to the request of 
Chairman Bernard for a brief Slli-nrr,arv of the benefits flowinc to 
the .ratepayers as a result of the p~oposed settlement of th~ 
t\exprc litigations, which settlement is presently !Jeing considered 
by the Cornrnission: 
1. An End of Litigation. 
Assuming that the complex litigations involving the 
· "" Wexpro issues continued for five ~ears at the level of effort ex-
perienced during the past nine months (with the ratepayer es-
sentially paying for counsel and experts on both sides}, the 
total cost to the ratepayer would easily exceed $7,000.000 for 
attorney and witness fees. This ~7,000,000 does not include the 
value of lost opportunity in the exploration and development 
program or the delay in receiving a return fro~ the various pro-
perties. 
2. 54% of the Net Profits from the Oil P~ooerties. 
We estimate that this benefit will be approximately 
SlO - 20,000,000 per year for the next 10 to 15 years. This 
estimate is very speculative since one cannot preGict wha~ wi~l 
happe o .~ uc tion, oil prices, volumes of ?roc.uction 
or f 
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3. Cost of Service Gas from the Oil Reservoirs. 
Durl.ng his testimony, 1'!r. Roseman estimated that : 
cost of service gas produced by Mountain Fuel and its subsidiaries 
would be approximately $2.00 per Mcf during the near future and 
that the market price of such gas would be $5 - 6 per Mcf. 
~ountain Fuel Supply's 1980 Annual Report indicates a current 
production of gas from its Wexpro property to be approximately 
2.5 million Mcf. That production should increase significantly 
as oil production gradually tails off and Wexpro begins to produce 
the gas reservoirs on those sa..rne properties~ However, assuming 
the 2. 5 m~llion Mcf annually and a cost of service/market price 
differen~ial of $3.00 per Mcf, the~net benefit to the ratepayer 
would be $7,500,000 per annum. This calculation involves numerous 
~ssumptions concerning inflation in cost of production and market 
?rices and thus is speculative. 
4. Elimination of Exoloration Allowances and Rates. 
We are informed that there is currently approximately 
$3,000,000 in Mountain.Fuel's retail gas rates reflecting an ex-
ploration allowance. It is estimated that in ·time this. exploration .1 
allowance would have to increase several fold. By shareholders 
bearing the total exploration risk and expense, the per annum 
benefit to ratepayers is $ 3, 0.00, 000+ -at the current rate and· what-
ever increases the Commission might estimate as being reasonable 
with respect to future projections. 
5. Carryinq Cost of 101 and 105 Leases. 
Approximately $4 - 5,000,000 per annum will be elimi-
nated from rates •. 
6. 7% overriding Royalty on Production from Exploration 
on Leases Currently Held in the 101 and 105 Accounts. 
To value the overriding royalty, one must make assump-
tions concerning the revenue produced from hydroc~rbons found.on 
these properties. Such projections are of necessity.speculative. 
Assumino however that exploration on these properties resulted 
eventually in gro~s revenues of $100,?00,000.per ann~m. (t~is wa~ 
the estimate used by Mr. Roserran in his testimony ana is wexpro s 
current revenues) it would result in a benefit to the ratepayer 
of $7,000,000 per annum. 
7. Right to Purchase Gas from the Exoloration Prooerties. 
The Agreement provides that the utility will have a 
first right of purchase on ~11 gas oroduced from the 101/105 
exploration properties and the 128,000+ acres of "after-acquired 11 
~~~P"~_£~~~i:~~~~,,0~ir~~~~~~ p~~~i~!~e~~~t t~h~~= ~~~~~:~:~ 
~~-=~-~'""~'""'"-==8~: 
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E:om this provision would be an assured future supply of gas. 
8 •. Cost of Service Gas from the Currently Producing 
Gas Reservoirs on the Account 101 Properties. 
Mountain Fuel currently produces approximately 
50,000,000 Mcf from its 101 properties at an average cost of 
service of 67¢ per Mcf. Mr. Roseman estimated that the develop-
ment program might increase the production f rorn these properties 
by another 50,000,000 Mcf per annum at a cost of service price 
of approximately $2.00 per Mcf. Assuming, as we did on the Wexpro 
gas, a differential between cost of service and market prices of 
$3.00 per Mcf, this right to cost of service gas could easily be 
worth $300,000,000 per annum. It should be noted that this was 
gas over which Mountain Fuel was attempting to obtain FERC juris-
diction and NGPA/deregulated prices. 
9. 2~ Percent Overriding Roval ty on Ce::-tai:i ":·;ildcat" 
Acreage Acquired by Wexpro Between January 1, 1977 and May 10, 
1979 and Certain Additional Acreage Associated with the "Bug 
Field". 
Once again we are speculating as to revenues :rom 
exploration of "wildcat" acreage. If we assume that this acreage 
produces revenues in the-neighborhood of $10,000,000 per annum 
the 2~ percent royalty would produce·a $250,000 a~~ual benefit 
to the ratepayer. · 
10. 21 Million Dollar Reduction in Cost of Service. 
The Agreement provides that over the first 12 months 
following approval of the Agreement there will be a $21,000,000 
.::-eduction in cost of service which we calculate gives apprc:>:i:nately 
$50. 00 _to the average residential ratepayer. ·· ··· 
11. Special Rate Reduction. 
The last paragraph of the.Agreement provides for a 
special rate reduction of $250,000.00 per year for 12 years. 
12. There is one other benefit which has been negotiated 
but is very difficult to quantify. The Agreement provides that 
future allocation between gas and oil of depreciation and costs 
associated with the oroducing properties will be done on a "market" 
rather than a "BTU" basis. 'l'his will result in the first year in ~ 
an allocation of 100 percent more costs and depreciati~n to the 
oil and away from the gas than in the immediately previous year. 
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--
--
I hope that this is responsive to the questions you had 
concerning the b.enefi ts accruing to the ratepayer as the result 
of the proposed settlement agreemen~ and stipulation. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Thomas A. Quinn 
TAQ/as -. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
